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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

STATINTL

PROGRAM The Today Show STATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE January 25, 1980 7:00 AM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Loosening the Reins on Intelligence Gathering

JANE PAULEY: After several years of tightening controls, it seems clear that the CIA's star is rising again in Washington.

Andrea Mitchell reports.

ANDREA MITCHELL: When the President talked about loosening the reins on intelligence gathering, CIA Director Stansfield Turner was clearly pleased. He has been pushing for a broad charter with fewer specific rules, especially on covert action.

The Administration will propose requiring the President to approve the most sensitive covert actions, not all secret activities, as he does now; requiring the CIA to report to only two congressional committees, not eight, as it does now; closing most CIA files to reporters and authors.

Now five senators, Republicans and Democrats, have introduced legislation to do all that.

MAN: Since 1974, we have almost dismantled this agency. We've made it almost impossible for it to compete. It is like a one-armed fighter in the right with somebody as capable as Ali.

MITCHELL: The senators insisted they weren't opening the door to abuses. So did the man blamed for some of those activities.

RICHARD HELMS: No, I don't think that this is a question of good old days or bad old days. I think this is a less-

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ON PAGE 31

THE WASHINGTON POST
22 January 1980

[redacted]

VIP

By Maxine Cheshire

Former CIA director Richard Helms says that it is not true that he recently called muckraker Jack Anderson an "a——" at a party and threatened the columnist's assistant with a karate chop.

"I can't imagine I said that," Helms says with amusement in his voice. "I have other terms I use for Mr. Anderson . . . I'm sure I never said that word."

Helms says that he did have an "animated" exchange with Anderson's aide, Les Whitten, on the evening in question, "but nobody threatened anybody."

Whitten's version is that he and Helms got into a "heated" argument and that Helms drew his hand back menacingly at one point.

"I thought he was going to hit me," Whitten says. "I told him to go ahead and hit me . . . which was pretty foolish, since I'm sure he's a black belt."

Helms would neither confirm nor deny that he is a black belt.

The confrontation is the latest in a years-long feud between Anderson and Helms. On Jan. 2, Anderson wrote a column stating that the shah of Iran had been Helms' "biggest-spending client" when Helms opened a consulting firm here.

Helms wrote a letter to the editors of The Washington Post denying that he had ever received "a single cent or rial" from "the shah or interests controlled by him."

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE E-7
WASHINGTON STAR
20 JANUARY 1980

Helms on moral purity in a hard, dirty world

This interview of Richard Helms was conducted by Kenneth Harris, executive editor of the London Observer.

The career of Richard Helms at the Central Intelligence Agency spanned 26 years, including seven years as director, 1966-73. He was a principal defender of the agency when the record of its performance in many countries, especially concerning covert action ("dirty tricks") came under severe attack in the 1970s.

This is adapted from a longer version published recently in the Observer.

Harris: Did you see any conflict between public concern over "dirty tricks" and the operation of an effective intelligence network?

Helms: There is a strange attitude that pervades American public opinion. Americans want a strong intelligence organization. They feel their government should know what's going on in the world. On the other hand, they don't much like hearing about dirty tricks or the connivery that is involved in espionage. They'd be delighted to have the operation run and not hear too much about it.

Many Americans — and I don't know whether this is a majority view — have the peculiar idea that the U.S. is so rich and so powerful and so wise that we don't need to demean ourselves with such things as espionage and covert action because, after all, we're a righteous, upstanding people and nothing's going to happen to us. We hold our banner high and set a good example, or so we believe. Well, that's all very nice, and in many respects it's kind of sweet, but is it very intelligent?

The approach of the Carter-Mondale administration has been to bend over backwards on all these issues of human rights and civil rights, as if a sovereign people didn't have an obligation to protect itself against foreigners who are spying on it; against its own citizens who engage in treasonable acts of one sort or another.

It seems to me that we've become in the past few years wonderfully sort of airy-fairy about the world in which we live, failing to recognize that it's a brutal world. This business of being righteous and upstanding I espouse and it would be fine if the other fellow were equally righteous and upstanding. But if he's going to take advantage of you and you still don't want to demean yourself to meet him on his own terms, then you have to take the consequences.

Q: Have American attitudes been influenced by what people have read in the newspaper about, for instance, the CIA conditioning people with drugs?

A: Well, I don't think there is any question but that the way this issue of drugs was played-up in the newspapers it did indeed make a bad impression on the American public. Mistakes were made in some of the liberties the agency took in the drug program, but the program as such seemed to be perfectly legitimate.

When the agency was established in 1947, we had the difficult problem of settling it into American society and the American bureaucracy. The CIA was a brand-new organization set up to do functions which had not been performed in the United States before.

As we looked at the world, what were some of the problems we were going to have to face? What were the Russians doing in the field of drugs, for example? This query was triggered by the fact that a Swiss chemist named Hoffman suddenly came up one day with a drug, now known as LSD, which was odorless, tasteless and colorless. In other words, pour it into a glass of water and you didn't even know it was there, and yet it had the power to turn a normal individual into a case of walking schizophrenia. Well, suppose, we said to ourselves, the Russians were to use something like this against us. Shouldn't we be prepared to know what the reactions are? How to diagnose it? What to look for?

There was the episode of George Kennan, our ambassador to the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, who made a speech in Berlin that got him declared *persona non grata* by the Russians. There was a feeling at the time that perhaps the Russians had contrived this and maybe they'd given him something like LSD and he was just disoriented. Ambassador Kennan has his own explanation these days as to why he gave the speech, but the fact remains it was one of the triggers that set off an examination of LSD.

Now, I recognize the widespread belief that the CIA administered it to unwitting people, including a man who jumped out of a window to his death. But Mr. [Frank R.] Olson was a member of a military group working on these things. He was part of a group that the agency was consulting with. He had well understood that he was going to be administered a drug, he didn't know what drug, he didn't know when it was going to be administered, but he understood the ground rules and so he was a willing participant in the experiment. I believe it is said that we didn't examine Olson's background sufficiently and that he had suicidal tendencies. His family, which was given a big sum of money by President Ford as a result of this episode, denies that he was suicidal, but I believe there is evidence to suggest he was. In any event, this experiment wasn't handled with sufficient safeguard, and everyone is genuinely sorry about it. But the fact that we were investigating what different kinds of drugs do to people seemed to me to be a perfectly rational thing for us to be doing in a world where such drugs might be used against innocent Americans.

The same thing applies to brainwashing. We did a lot of work to try to ascertain how brainwashing was accomplished, why it was accomplished, what its reaction on prisoners was and so forth. The point I want to make is that we felt these were fields we ought to investigate in order to protect ourselves if such methods were used against us.

Q: You seem to be implying that in the interests of national security, a loyal intelligence man will stop at nothing: drugging, assassination — anything. Many people would claim to be horrified by that. I'm not sure they would all be sincere in doing so, but they would make public noises to that effect.

A: I recognize that and I'm not con-

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tending for one minute that intelligence officers should be devoid of morality. I don't think John le Carre has done any particular service by suggesting that some intelligence operatives are worked-over psychotic cases who don't understand the borders or limits of human conduct. But where do you draw the line?

How far should a man go in the dim twilight of some types of intelligence work, some types of covert action? I submit that the British public might feel differently about these matters in a different context. If there were a war on, they might feel one way, whereas if there were not, they might feel another.

It becomes even more complicated in our country, where we've had two wars, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, that were undeclared wars. Were they, or were they not, wars in the legalistic sense of the term? Certainly people were fighting one another, and certainly people were killing one another. In these circumstances, trying to draw the moral profile of an intelligence officer is a difficult thing to do. Certainly the men with whom I was associated in the CIA had no interest in going around killing people, and they didn't kill. Assassination is no part of an intelligence officer's duty.

I believe there are certain *other* types of activity in which American intelligence officers should not participate. The American public won't sit still for drug trafficking, torture or physical brutality. These are things that most of us know very clearly the American people won't tolerate.

But the public should be fair enough to recognize that in war things might be different. In World War II, for example, there was a lot at stake. The British commandos who were trained by Col. Fairbairn weren't taught to fight fair; they were trained to survive, to kill with stealth, and if they couldn't kill the enemy, to maim him. This was, I think, quite proper in the circumstances. But if it were to be done today — if the whole lexicon of dirty tricks were to be applied — people would be quite shaken by it.

Q: To an onlooker, it seems that the CIA is no longer under fierce attack from within America. Does this mean that the agency has been rendered so ineffective it can no longer do a good job?

A: Two things have happened. First, there is a slowly changing mood in the United States about these matters. Many Americans are realizing that we went a little bit far after the Vietnam War in criticizing ourselves and our role in the world.

Second, public opinion is swinging back in favor of an increased defense budget. People are becoming aware of the powerful military machine the Soviets have been building in the past 10 or 15 years. This is causing a shift in sentiment toward better intelligence, better defense — in other words, getting our guard up.

Take the Soviet military machine the way it is today and imagine a replay of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. How would the Russians react now? I once heard John McCloy, who was appointed by President Kennedy to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian weapons from Cuba in 1962, tell the following story to President Johnson. McCloy described how he was sitting on a fence at his farm up in Connecticut with Kuznetsov, the Soviet negotiator, settling the arrangements for taking out the Ilyushin bombers from Cuba. They were sitting on the fence so there couldn't possibly be any technical intrusion into their conversation. Kuznetsov, according to McCloy, said, "All right, Mr. McCloy, we withdraw the bombers, just as we've withdrawn the missiles, but I want to tell you something — this is the last time the United States is going to be able to act like this towards the Soviet Union."

That was at the end of 1962. So whatever Mr. Kuznetsov had in mind at the time, if you look at it in the perspective of 1979, the Soviets have done a very good job of increasing their military forces to a point where I don't know how the U.S. could really oblige them to do what they did not want to do.

President Truman got the Russians out of Iran in 1946 simply by indicating that they'd *better* get out. We had the atomic bomb, and they didn't in those days. We got them to turn around at the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 because they were heading into a difficult situation in which it was clear to them, I believe, that the United States was far more powerful in strategic weapons and probably in conventional weapons as well.

But now that the Russians have this very large strategic force, the shoe may be on the other foot. Democracies have a difficult problem making decisions in this kind of context. The Soviets don't have that problem. The leadership decides what they're going to do, and they go ahead and do it.

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, as we lined up our naval vessels and said to the Russians, "Don't send your ships any further," suppose the Russians had replied, "All right, that's what you told us, but there's freedom of the seas, we're going right on through to Cuba." What is the decision an American president makes in that situation? It's going to be a very tough decision indeed. And I leave it at that. I'm not going to develop it — there's no sense in our playing war games.

Q: It seems to me that what many Americans want is for their government to eschew all "covert" action.

A: Any country that gets itself into such a position that it can't accomplish its ends by diplomacy, or by overt economic action, and has to send in troops or marines, turns its back entirely on the fact that there are situations in which defense can be manipulated *covertly*.

It seems to me that it is just plain silly to deny oneself this possibility, this kind of a utensil, this kind of equipment. But one does run into the difficulty that people tend to react in an exaggerated way: "Oh, you're going into covert action; you're going to blow up things, upset governments, you're going to do all these terrible things. We shouldn't do these things."

I don't think one ought to prejudge these situations and possibilities. I think these are questions and decisions which should be left to our governing authorities. Do you want to influence an election in such and such a country? Do you want to intrude yourself in another country? How do you want to help our paramilitary forces here? Such questions *have* to be answered, and the necessary decisions taken by the government. We should not contrive legally, statutorily and in other ways to put ourselves in a strait jacket, tie our hands behind our back.

As for the morality of so-called meddling in the affairs of another country, I would agree that in a perfect world, like the Garden of Eden, one should not and need not do these things. But in our world — in which other countries are constantly undermining our security and strength — it's a different matter.

. . . People like to feel proud of what a clean, decent and righteous country we have. But the fundamental fact remains that you've got to trust somebody in your government. If you don't, what kind of a government have you got? Are we a governable people? If we're a governable people we have got to have some trust in the people we pick to govern. And if we can't do this, then I think there are a lot of other things we aren't going to be able to do, in-

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cluding the whole running of the country. And, therefore, I think that building in all these limitations is quite unnecessary. And these so-called abuses that the agency has been charged with in the past, really, when you examine them, weren't all that bad or all that serious, and to set up an entire legal structure in an effort to prevent some little abuse in the future seems to me the wrong way to approach this problem . . .

Q: Would there be less criticism of "covert" action if we hadn't heard so much about the failures?

A: I recognize that it is the failures that get in the newspapers. Of course, what is a failure to some is a success to others. Those who believe that it's immoral to do these things will tell you, even when we have had a success, that it was wrong. Looked at in that perspective, almost everything done in a foreign field is wrong because it's influencing events which theoretically should be influenced by other people. But history shows that world powers adopting that attitude have not survived very long.

When I said that people prefer not to hear about some of the necessary measures so they don't have them on their consciences, I'm prepared to believe that's true also. But then, this is not a new phenomenon in human life. We're all touched with a bit of hypocrisy.

Q: How do you feel about the general situation, Mr. Helms? Are we moving nearer to a third world war?

A: That is an extraordinarily difficult question for me to answer. But if the Soviets become so powerful militarily that we are not able to compete effectively in the world, then we do come to a point of considerable danger. The reason I say this is that the Soviets might be tempted to call our bluff.

One really dramatic change that has not yet impressed itself on the American people is that for the last five years the United States has been dependent for its energy on foreign countries. Historically, the United States has been independent of foreign sources for all the necessities of life — private, economic, industrial and so on. We went into World War II and built tanks, airplanes, anything you like, all without any by-your-leave from anyone else. Now this has changed. Our economic life is tied to the Persian Gulf region. Suddenly we have a vital interest in that oil supply continuing to flow.

The Persian Gulf is very near the Soviet Union on the map. If the Soviets for some reason were to challenge us in this area, I don't believe that we could retreat. If we did, we would, effectively, be in their hands.

Q: When you say, "retreat"

A: By retreat I mean retreat to the point where they took control of the countries that had the oil, and could give it to us or deny it to us as they happened to feel on any given day. This would create unquestionably a crisis of the first magnitude. Whether it would lead to a third world war would depend on a whole lot of factors which have not yet eventuated. I don't think the Soviets will be tempted to start a third world war. Certainly *we* are not going to start a third world war unless really challenged. But I don't regard this question casually, I note that as in a checkers game the Soviets are quietly moving pieces on the board. In Cuba one day, in Afghanistan the next. Their behavior in Afghanistan will, I think, tell us a lot about their aims toward the Persian Gulf area and the Indian Ocean. [The interview was conducted before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.]

I don't believe myself to be a so-called hardliner, but we've got to stand up for ourselves and not read into Soviet intentions something that is not there and was never intended. Americans are constantly saying that the Soviets won't do this or won't do that when they don't have any solid evidence to support their contention. One should read earlier Soviet statements about their position in the world and what their aims are in the long run. They're patient, they're prudent, they move slowly and carefully, but they move. Almost like a glacier if you like. And I have yet to have anybody put in my hand a responsible Soviet statement from a high Soviet official or political body like the Politburo or the Presidium that takes back any of those aims or objectives which the Soviets have consistently set for themselves over the years. And that includes the export of their system to other countries.

As in the case of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, we ought to pay attention to what the Soviets write and say and not what we think they might be writing and saying.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-2

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
10 JANUARY 1980

Theory and Practice:

A Diplomats' Debate, in the Shadow of Iran



Ex-CIA head William Colby.

By Boris Weintraub
Washington Star Staff Writer

It's one of those questions that confront all diplomats at some time, a nuts-and-bolts question that nonetheless spills over into the policy field — particularly at a time when the shadow of Iran looms so large.

The question is this: When you are a diplomat, do you maintain contact with the opposition to the established government in the country?

Simple, perhaps. But then the questions start to multiply, and take unusual twists and turns, and start doubling back on each other, and pretty soon, it becomes a very, very delicate matter:

How do you decide what is legitimate opposition and what is a kooky fringe? At what level should any contact be made? What do you do if you are serving in an authoritarian country that considers such contacts ground for grave displeasure? How do you make such contacts so as to get the proper information you need without making it seem that you are encouraging the opposition to expect U.S. support?

So when a covey of diplomatic practitioners who made up a very substantial segment of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment for the last three decades, as well as at least half a dozen foreign envoys to Washington, got together yesterday at Georgetown University in a sea of gray-flannel pinstripes to discuss the issue, it seemed not very simple at all.

They were [illegible] under the auspices of the relatively new Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, which is intended to raise questions like these, questions of diplomatic processes, diplomatic mechanics, rather than those in the policy area. But as the discussion proceeded, the policy questions were unavoidable. And, as it is almost everywhere these days, the Iranian spectre was present.

The panelists discussing the issue provide a fair index to the level of participants in the symposium. They included former CIA Director William Colby; former Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker; former Ambassador to the United Nations Charles Yost; Thomas L. Hughes, president of the Carnegie Endowment and a former diplomat; and John Wills Tuthill, former ambassador to, among other places, Brazil. (Henry Kissinger spoke in an afternoon session, but put his appearance totally off the record.)

Almost everyone agreed that American diplomats abroad should maintain some sort of contact with the opposition. But that was merely a starting point. Almost everyone provided horror stories of one sort of another designed to show that this is easier said than done, and that, even if good contacts are established, it may not mean a thing to the execution of American foreign policy.

"When I was serving in France in the 1950s," said Yost, a career diplomat, "some of us saw the probability that the government would fall and that Charles de Gaulle would come to power. We did our best to cultivate those around him. But the problem was a rift between the United States and de Gaulle going back before World War II. That created a resentment in the general's mind which plagued us later."

Hughes harkened back to his days as deputy chief of mission in London during 1969 and 1970, when a flap developed over whether the U.S. should close its consulate in Southern Rhodesia to protest the refusal of Rhodesian whites to share power with blacks.

As he described it, the American ambassador to London, Walter Annenberg, "spent most of his time [illegible] the embassy, which meant that dealing with the Labor government of Harold Wilson fell to the embassy's political officer, who the Conservatives. Meanwhile, the Conservative opposition of Edward Heath, which was about to depose the Labor government, was establishing its own secret contacts with Kissinger and his staff in the Nixon White House, which, in contrast to the policy of the State Department, was tilting in favor of the Ian Smith regime and "practicing benign neglect" toward black Africa.

In that jumbled context, said Hughes, who *was* the opposition?

Over and over again, the panelists and members of the audience, which included a large number of former high-ranking ambassadors and State Department officials past and present, complained that they knew of opposition to established regimes that were gaining strength in their countries and eventually took power. Again and again, they told of reporting this to Washington, but being ignored by policy-makers here for one frustrating reason or another.

"The problem may be that at home, at the highest levels, there is a predisposition to see the situation in a certain way, and a reluctance to move away from a particular policy," said Yost in quiet diplomatese.

Certainly, the most fervent arguments about contacts with the opposition were stirred up over the subject of Iran, where even former Ambassador Richard Helms, a career intelligence official, has conceded that the U.S. was the victim of an intelligence failure.

Helms, in an article written for an

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ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 72
TIME 7 JANUARY 1980

World

AFGHANISTAN

Steel Fist in Kabul

A Soviet coup overthrows Amin and sets a fearsome precedent

It was the most brutal blow from the Soviet Union's steel fist since the Red Army's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In a lightning series of events last week, Afghanistan's President Hafizullah Amin was overthrown, and subsequently executed, in a ruthless coup mounted by the Soviet Union and carried out with the firepower of Soviet combat troops. In Amin's place, Moscow installed Babrak Karmal, a former Deputy Prime Minister long considered to be a Soviet protégé, but not before Russian troops were forced to fight a sporadic series of gun battles in the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan's capital.

At week's end the Carter Administration charged that Moscow was launching an outright invasion of its neighbor, with two mechanized Soviet divisions crossing the border and heading for Kabul. U.S. intelligence estimates indicated that at least 20,000 troops were in Afghanistan. Said White House spokesman Jody Powell: "The magnitude of the Soviet invasion continues to grow."

The Soviets obviously hoped that their brazen, perhaps desperate, action could help their puppet regime bring a stubborn Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan under control and thus stabilize a dangerous flash point on their southern border. But the coup, in fact, added a new dimension of uncertainty to an area of the world already deeply disturbed by the crisis in Iran. Moreover, the deployment of Soviet troops on foreign soil in Central Asia set a fearsome precedent that cast new shadows over international détente and Moscow-Washington relations. The SALT II accord, already in difficulty in the U.S. Senate, seemed even further jeopardized by the Soviet action.

Outraged reaction came swiftly from the White House. In the strongest language he has ever directed against Moscow, President Carter, in a televised message, said: "Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior." He conveyed the same harsh message to Leonid Brezhnev personally on the rarely used White House–Kremlin hot line. At the same time, the President got in touch directly with Western European leaders and President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq of Pakistan, among others, in an attempt to obtain a collective condemnation of Moscow. All shared his concern. As a result, the weekend to discuss the situation with U.S. allies.

Other countries obviously were just as concerned about the Soviet military intervention. Peking fumed that "Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty have become toys in Moscow's hands." Iran's Revolutionary Council declared that the intervention in a neighboring country was "a hostile action" against "Muslims throughout the world." Interestingly, however, there were no attacks on Russian embassies.

The first dramatic signs of the Soviet action appeared on Christmas morning. Moscow suddenly began a massive airlift of combat soldiers to Afghanistan. The suspected motive at the time: to help the Afghan regime put down the rebellion of conservative Muslim tribesmen. In full sight of arriving and departing passengers, wave after wave of Soviet An-12 and An-22 transports landed at Kabul's international airport and unloaded not only combat troops but equipment ranging from field kitchens to armored vehicles.

By Thursday the real motive of the intervention was clear: Radio Kabul suddenly announced that President Amin, a tough, repressive Communist who had seized power only last September from former President Noor Mohammed Taraki, had been deposed. The new President, the broadcast said, was former Deputy Prime Minister Karmal. A later announcement specified that Amin had been convicted of "crimes against the people" and executed, along with members of his family. Radio Kabul failed to mention that in the upheaval, Soviet military units had entered combat for the first time since their border clashes against China in 1969.

The fighting began at 7:30 in the evening, according to the U.S. State Department, with Soviet troops and weapons deployed in key locations of Kabul. In a 3½-hour battle for the radio station, Soviet troops using armored personnel carriers knocked out two Afghan tanks and took a number of prisoners. At one point a U.S. official reported with some relish, "The Soviets are getting shot up pretty well." Soviet-built MiG-21 jets flew over-[illegible] city was reported quiet.

The next day, however, diehard supporters of Amin resumed the fighting in Kabul. The coup, scoffed the rebel command, represented nothing more than "a change in pawns." The Japanese embassy said that gunfire could still be heard along the road leading from the Soviet embassy to the old royal palace. Nonetheless, as soon as word reached Moscow that the coup was successful, the Soviets quickly broadcast Karmal's denunciation of the Amin dictatorship as an agent of "American imperialism."

The move against Afghanistan was the first time since World War II that Moscow had used significant numbers of its own armed forces in a state outside the Warsaw Pact. It seemed an ominous extension into Asia of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserts that Moscow has the right to assist any socialist state in trouble. Moscow, of course, claimed that it intervened only at the request of the Karmal government under the terms of a 20-year friendship treaty signed in December 1978. The Russians made no attempt to disguise the fact that the airlift began two days before the coup that brought Karmal to power, thus making a mockery of their rationale.

The military buildup had, in fact, begun several weeks before the airlift. The best analysis of U.S. intelligence at that time was that the Soviets were matching Washington's naval and air buildup in the Middle East. It later seemed, however, that apart from any U.S. buildup, Moscow acted primarily to meet a situation in Afghanistan it could no longer effectively control. The Russians apparently decided to make their show of force in the shadow of the Iranian problem, much as they had intervened in Hungary in 1956 while the West was preoccupied with the Suez crisis. Moscow

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
6 January 1980

[redacted]

STATINTL

Walter Scott's Personality Parade

Q. *Is it a fact that Richard Helms and William Colby, both former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, hate each other so much that neither will appear in the same room with the other? What is the source of their enmity?—J.L., Arlington, Va.*

A. Colby does not hate Helms, but Helms was found guilty of perjured testimony before a Senate committee and reportedly holds Colby responsible for releasing the "family jewels"—those CIA in-house secrets that subsequently brought him down. As director of the CIA, Helms believed he was working for the President of the U.S.; Colby believed he was working for the people. The difference in philosophies is responsible for the enmity, more pronounced on Helms's side than Colby's.

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 January 1980

[redacted]

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

[redacted]

Not a Cent From the Shah

In the Jack Anderson column of Jan. 2, it is asserted that I "opened a consulting firm in Washington for the ostensible purpose of serving as 'go-between' for foreign interests seeking to do business in the United States." In point of fact, I established the firm to do the opposite: assist American companies to do business in Iran.

The column also asserts: "His [Helms'] biggest-spending client—you guessed it—was Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi." The shah has never been my client. I have never received a single cent or rial from the shah or interests controlled by him.

RICHARD HELMS

Washington